



A Note on Pooling Systems
and Heterogeneity of Fishing Technology
in the Presence of Externalities
on Fishing Costs
??????? ?
Focusing on pooling systems that have been introduced by ¯sheries
cooperatives in Japan, this paper theoretically examines the e®ects of
introducing pooling systems on catch amounts and pro¯ts of ¯shers.
In particular, heterogeneity on ¯shing technology/¯shing costs among
¯shers is introduced into the model. Moreover, this paper considers the
possibility of consensus building among ¯shers. We ¯nd that introduction
of any type of pooling system leads to decreases in catch amounts. We
also ¯nd that the pro¯ts of ¯shers can be negative under some type
of pooling systems, while other types of pooling systems may achieve
Pareto improvement. In the latter case, ¯shers are able to agree on the
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7) Gaspert and Seki?2003???????? social esteem ???????Platteau and
Seki?2007??????????????????????????? social esteem ???
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??????????? N ?????????????? nG ?????
???????? G??1???????????????????????
???????? nB (N ¡ nA)????????????????? B??1
????????????????? G????????????????
????????????????????????????
CG;i = ®GX xi; i = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; nG;
CB;j = ®BX xj ; j = nG + 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; N:
i??? j ????????? G?????? B ????????????
???xi ??? xj ????????? i?????? j ?????????




















































¼k;l = pxl ¡ ®kXxl; k = G;B; l = i; j: (1)






























???¦ = pX¡®GXXG¡®BXXB ????Xk =
P







= p¡ ®GX ¡ ®GXG ¡ ®BXB = 0; (2)
@¦
@XB
= p¡ ®GXG ¡ ®BX ¡ ®BXB = 0; (3)
??????@2¦=@X2G < 0???? @
2¦=@X2B < 0???2???????
??????(2)?? (3)???????????? 1??????????
???????????????®G < ®B ???????????????
? B ???????????????X¤B = 0??????????(2)???
@¦
@XG

















= p¡ ®kX ¡ ®kxl = 0; k = G;B; l = i; j
???????@2¼k;l=@xl = ¡2®k < 0????????2?????????
?????????????G?????????????????xi = xNG??











p¡ ®G (nG + 1)xNG ¡ ®GnBxNB = 0;
p¡ ®BnGxNG ¡ ®B (nB + 1)xNB = 0:
????
¡ ®G (nG + 1) < 0; ¡®B (nB + 1) < 0;
®G®B (nG + 1) (nB + 1) ¡ ®G®BnGnB > 0
????????????????????????13)??????????
????????????
xNG = p ¢ ®B + (®B ¡ ®G)nB
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
; xNB = p ¢ ®G ¡ (®B ¡ ®G)nG
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
;
XN = p ¢ ®BnG + ®GnB






®B + (®B ¡ ®G)nB






®G ¡ (®B ¡ ®G)nG
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
2
13) ???????????Seade?1980?????????Furusawa et al.?2003?????
??????????????????
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??????14)????@xNG=@nG < 0???? ®x
N
B =@nB < 0?????
?????????? k (k = G;B)???????????????? k ?
????????????????????@xNB=@nG < 0????????








¢ (®B ¡ ®G) (nG + 1)¡ ®B




????????? B ????????????? G??????????
????????????????????????? B ????????
???????????(4)???






























XN ¡X¤ = ®B (nG ¡ 1)¡ (®B ¡ 2®G)nB
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
??????????????? G???????????? B ?????






































¡ ®GX ¡ ®Gxi = 0; @¼B;j
@xj




???????? 2 ?????????????????? xPGG ???
xPGB ???????????????????(7)????????????
????????????????
xPGG = p ¢ ®B (nB + 1)=nG ¡ ®GnB
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
; xPGB = p ¢ ®G (nG + 1)¡ ®B






B = p ¢ ®B + ®GnB
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
¼PGG = ®Gp
2 ¢ (®B (nG + nB)¡ ®GnB) ¢ (®B (nB + 1)=nG ¡ ®GnB)





®G (nG + 1)¡ ®B
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
2
?? 2??????????????? B ???????????????
?????????????????????????????




















¡ ®BX ¡ ®Bxj = 0





xPBG = p ¢ ®B (nB + 1)¡ ®G
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
; xPBB = p ¢ ®G (nG + 1)=nB ¡ ®BnG






B = p ¢ ®BnG + ®G




®B (nB + 1)¡ ®G
®G®B (nG + nB + 1)
2
¼PBG = ®Bp
2 ¢ (®G (nG + nB)¡ ®BnG) ¢ (®G (nG + 1)=nB ¡ ®BnG)
(®G®B (nG + nB + 1))
2 ;
?? 3????? G???????? 1????????????????

























¡ ®BX ¡ ®Bxj = 0;
???????????? 2?????????????????? xPPG ?
?? xPPB ???????? G?????????????????????
????????????????????
xPPG = p ¢ ®B (nB + 1)¡ ®GnG
®G®BnG (nG + nB + 1)
; xPPB = p ¢ ®G (nG + 1)¡ ®BnB
®G®BnG (nG + nB + 1)
;
XPP = p ¢ ®GnG (nG ¡ nB + 1) + ®BnB (nB ¡ nG + 1)
®G®BnGnB (nG + nB + 1)
¼PPG = (p¡ ®GXPP ) ¢ xPPG ; ¼PPB = (p¡ ®BXPP ) ¢ xPPB
????????????????????????????????????
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¡ ®kX xl; k = G;B; l = i; j:







¡ ®k (X + xl) = 0
???????????? 2?????????????????? xPTG ?
?? xPTB ?????????????????????????????
xPTG = p ¢ ®B + (®B ¡ ®G)nB
®G®B (nG + nB + 1) (nG + nB)
;
xPTB = p ¢ ®G ¡ (®B ¡ ®G)nG
®G®B (nG + nB + 1) (nG + nB)
XPTG = p ¢ ®GnB + ®BnG
®G®B (nG + nB + 1) (nG + nB)
¼PTk = p ¢ ®GnB + ®BnG
®G®B (nG + nB + 1) (nG + nB)
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B ?????? 4?????? p = 10?®G = 1?®B = 1:4???????























18) ? 1 ????????????????????????? B ????????? 0 ????
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